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I Introduction
Over the last decade or so the issue of corruption
has been prominent in the politics of a majority of
the countries of Latin America. At least two Presi-
dents have been forced out of office and others
have subsequently had to flee their countries in the
face of corruption charges. There have been pub-
lic demonstrations against it in Argentina and
Brazil. Cabinet ministers have been sacked in
Mexico and judges purged in Venezuela. Congres-
sional committees have investigated, anti-corrup-
tion agencies have been established, and new
legislation enacted. And everywhere, editors,
bishops and academics have fulminated.'
Making sense of this furore is more difficult than
describing it. Identifying what might be done in a
practical way to lessen the incidence of corruption
is yet more difficult. Broadly, there appear to be
three sorts of approaches to the problem.
The first (and by far the most common) view has
been well expressed by ex-President Arias of
Costa Rica:
When the public at large demonstrate for more
accountable and decent government ... they are
motivated, to no small extent, by anger over
corruption: corruption that humiliates the
poor who must bribe small officials for mini-
mal services; corruption that bankrupts the
honest trader; corruption that empowers
unscrupulous captains of commerce and their
partners, dishonest politicians; corruption
which spreads like a cancer to kill all that is
decent in society'
Here Arias is arguing what might be called the
reform position, viz, that corruption is a pervasive
ill which damages economic performance and
weakens democratic institutions. However, he also
claims that it is not acceptable to the general
By corruption, I am focusing on the abuse of public
office whether elected or appointed. I am not concerned
with business fraud or nepotism, but with illegal actions
by public agents which are committed for private
advantage. As I argue in an earlier piece (Little t992),
for both ethical and practical reasons, corruption is
above all an elite-level problem.
Speech gïven to the international anti-corruption
Transparency International NGO in Berlin, 1993.
public, by extension implying that while democracy
may be threatened by corruption it is also capable
of combating it. No explanation of the social or
economic causes of corruption is offered but there
are some implicit remedies: more explicit legisla-
tive prohibition, more vigorous executive action,
and more effective punishment among them.
Counterpoised to the reform view is what might be
called the realist position. Understandably less
commonly advanced, it would argue that corrup-
tion has been endemic in Latin America since colo-
nial times and is a reflection of deep cultural
traditions (among them familism, clientelism, and
corporatism) which cannot be seriously modified
by this or that government, democratic or not
(Pietschman 1982; Leys 1989). Realists could var-
iously argue that corruption is damaging to society
or that it may be in some way useful, but they could
plausibly add that it is an issue which tends to come
to the fore when times are hard and to subside in
periods of prosperity They could also argue that its
political salience in recent years is a kind of theatre,
a phoney war of denunciation which will produce
little or nothing in the way of results and may
indeed be a way of pre-empting reform.
Finally liberals would agree with reformers that
something should and could be done but would
differ radically in what they would do. For them
the answer lies not in state action but in state
restructuring because, they would argue, it has been
the Latin American tradition of state preponderance
over civil society which is the root cause of the phe-
nomenon of corruption. Traditionally monopolis-
tic, over-powerful, inefficient, and unaccountable,
the state survives by extorting rent corruptly from
the private realm, If it were to be diminished in size
and power (via downsizing, privatization, and de-
regulation) then the provision of public goods
could be made more transparent, efficient, and
honest.
There is something to be said for each of these posi-
tions, but each also has its problems. The reform
view that the critical issue is to do with political
will does not encompass the deeper structures of
corruption and hence seems rather voluntaristic.
The realist position (more or less do nothing since
Quoted by Loveman and Davies 1978: 209.
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nothing much can be done) is more coherent, but it
is not one which can be easily sold politically
Finally while the liberal position's critique of the
state would be acceptable to many, it adopts a
remarkably ingenuous view of the extent to which
the private sector in Latin America can do better
than the public one.
For all their differences, these various approaches
have in common the implied judgement that cor-
ruption flourishes under conditions of uncompeti-
tiveness and secrecy To the extent that democracy
is competitive and open, it could be argued that it
is in some way incompatible with corruption. The
rest of this essay addresses this question.
2 Militarism, Party Politics and
Corruption
One of the more surprising aspects of the demilita-
rization of Latin America over the last two decades
has been the relative absence of charges that the
military ruled corruptly This may reflect circum-
spection or simply that there have been more
important priorities (such as human rights trials) in
military-civilian relations. But it is also possible
that, contrary to what one might expect from
regimes that were beyond the law, levels of corrup-
tion were relatively modest.
This would certainly be a popular view among the
military themselves. Indeed, in almost every case
the charge that civilian politics was corrupt and that
the military would at least rule honestly was part of
the apologia for their intervention in the first place.
The manifesto of the Peruvian coup of 1968 was
typical and can be taken to be sincerely felt when it
referred to:
government leaders (who) with other corrupt
politicians scorned the popular will ... proof of
this can be seen in the government's lack of
direction, its compromises, its immorality, its
corruption.
The evidence is that, in some countries at least, the
record of the military may have been better than
either that of their civilian predecessors or succes-
sors. It is not easy to tell because whistle-blowing
is difficult when the press is censored, parliament
closed, and whistle-blowers liable to summary
detention or worse. Corruption under the military
seems to have taken institutionalized rather than
personal form: double payment (as serving officers
and civilian administrators) was common; pay and
fringe benefits were disproportionately improved;
above all, huge sums were spent (and wasted) on
armaments and infrastructural projects which ben-
efited the military as a class. Obviously some offi-
cers took bribes and some may have grown rich but
this Paraguay and Central America apart - does
not seem to have been especially widespread. It is
a curiosity that some of the worst instances of mili-
tary corruption (especially concerning the drug
trade) have occurred in Colombia, Mexico and
Venezuela under civilian governments.
If this interpretation is correct, the main explana-
tory factor seems to have been the degree to which
the military had a radical project which could have
been endangered by grossly corrupt use of office.
Chile (and to a lesser extent Brazil and Argentina)
illustrate this point. Pinochet ran a brutal military
dictatorship for 16 years during which time well-
connected civilians made fortunes, but hardly any
cases of fraud and corruption have been unearthed.
It is as if the maxim of the regime was 'you may kill
but you may not steal'.
It is with the return of civilians to power that cor-
ruption has become a public issue. The reform
approach could argue that this was only to be
expected given greater press freedom, parliamen-
tary immunity, and electoral competition. It would
certainly argue that, while corruption might be a
threat to democracy, it has to become a matter of
public concern before anything can be done about
it. Realists and liberals would probably agree
though they would differ over what, if anything,
might control it.
But there is another possibility: namely, that
democracy as it has been practised in Latin America
is actually productive of corruption. This would
involve some consideration of the themes of per-
sonal and party economy, the relationship between
The case of Menem's Ferrari is a classic. A 'gift' from
an Italian firm, Menem paid no duty on it, did not tax
or register it, and drove it around Argentina at illegally
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party and state, and the clientelistic structures of
party politics.
At the personal level there are of course honest
politicians in Latin America. Indeed, Presidents
Fujimori of Peru and Caldera of Venezuela have got
where they are because they are widely perceived
to have high levels of personal integrity But there
are also plenty of dishonest ones, particularly at
lower levels in the political system where public
scrutiny is much less. An important element here
would seem to be the economic vulnerability of the
middle-income, educated classes from amongst
whom most of the political class is recruited.
Opportunities in the private sector where the fam-
ily firm is still important are not extensive enough
to meet demand arid in countries with long tradi-
tions of high inflation and political volatility confi-
dence in the future availability of valued goods
such as health care, education and pensions is
understandably fragile. Though elected officials are
well paid by local standards in most countries, the
temptation to use office corruptly in order to build
a capital stake is often irresistible.
The temptation becomes all the stronger because of
the tradition of impunity. The corrupt are confident
that they are unlikely to be caught and that, even if
they are, few sanctions will follow. Even if caught
and prosecuted they are unlikely to be convicted
and gaoled. And even in this highly unlikely event,
their assets will not be sequestered. In such a situ-
ation honesty can begin to look eccentric.
Impunity also has a cultural dimension. A politi-
cian such as President Menem of Argentina who has
been grossly nepotistic in appointments to his per-
sonal staff may be seen by a select few as a vulgar-
ian, but he is not the object of general social
condemnation. In societies where the bonds of
friendship and family remain important and where
public trust is at best uncertain, self-regarding
behaviour, whilst officially frowned upon, does not
result in social ostracism or loss of status.4
Venezuela illustrates the issue of impunity well.
The problem is certainly not a legal one. In addition
high speeds. When asked about the propriety of his
behaviour, he replied that he was just doing what every
Argentine would do, given half a chance.
to the general provision of the constitution, the
1982 Public Property Protection Law (Ley Organico
de Salvaguardia del Patrimonio Publico or LOSPP)
identifies the following as grounds for prosecution:
the procuring of illegal advantage in the administra-
tion of public affairs; any official act performed or
not performed in return for cash or other benefits
whether received or not; private agreements
between public servants and others (including
intermediaries) concerning contracts, services, or
goods which prejudice public monies; misuse of
public funds; the issuing of false documentation;
influence trafficking; the illegal issue of permits;
alteration of documents; negligence or failure to
support the proper actions of public bodies. The
exhaustive nature of the LOSPP provisions suggests
that its drafters had no illusions as to the extent and
variety of corrupt behaviour in Venezuela.
Nor is it the case that Venezuela lacks agencies and
institutions whose job is to investigate the abuse of
public office. Besides the ordinary police and court
system they include DISIP (Military intelligence),
the Contraloría (Audit Office), the Ministerio
Público (Attorney General's Office), the PTJ
(Technical Judicial Police), the Audit Commissions
of Congress, the Superintendancy of Banks, and
the TSS (Public Property Protection Tribunal).
Rather it is that is has too many uncoordinated,
under-financed agencies, This may or may not
be deliberate.
The result has been scandals such as the Recadi
one. Originating out of a 1988 decision to abandon
fixed convertibility and adopt a differential
exchange-rate system, it is generally believed in
Venezuela that it led to the fraudulent loss of
around $US 11 billion of hard currency, most of
which found its way abroad. By any standards this
is a large sum and its misappropriation (via over-
invoicing, phantom companies, and false valuation)
involved most of the import sector, many state and
foreign companies, the political parties, and the
highest public authorities, among them the Central
Bank. Yet despite the fact that so much of the eco-
nomic and political establishment was involved,
only one individual - a naturalized Chinese, Ho
Fuk Wing - was ever convicted. Upon his release
Typically, he has just been exonerated by his allies in
Congress but prosecution may still result. The United
States has been particularly critical of him.
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after a two year sentence the 'expiatory Chinaman'
(as he was dubbed in Venezuela) declared, 'I was a
political prisoner. Twenty thousand firms benefited
from preferential Recadi dollars ... and I've been the
only one jailed' (Capriles 1992: 582). He seems to
have had a point.
There is also the matter of party finances. Though
some political parties in Latin America date back to
the last century and enjoy impressive levels of voter
support, they are institutionally very weak and
prone to 'capture' by wealthy individuals and spe-
cial interests. Hard core membership is normally
very low and membership dues are a correspond-
ingly insignificant factor in party income. This
might not matter were it not for the fact that the
current wave of democratization in Latin America
has been accompanied by almost continuous elec-
tioneering at every level of the political system. The
cost (especially the electronic media cost) of elec-
tions has risen dramatically in recent years and has
forced politicians into actively soliciting money and
help in kind from the private sector which of course
is not given without strings attached. The most
notorïous current example is President Samper of
Colombia who is under investigation for accepting
money from the drug cartels to finance his success-
ful 1994 campaign.5
The problem of the politicization of the state appa-
ratus is of long standing. In Mexico, for example,
by the early 1 980s it had reached the point where
the distinction between the dominant PRI
(Institutional Revolutionary Party) and the public
sector became next to indiscernible. Even in the
1994 elections (supposedly the most plural and
honest in Mexico's history) PRI candidates had
their printing done by the Ministry of Education,
their speeches broadcast by state TV and radio, and
their transport laid on by a whole range of public
bodies. Mexico, of course, remains essentially a
one-party state, but the problem of the colonization
of state agencies by the political parties (parti-
clocracia as it is called) is evident in multi-party
systems as well. Colonization - as liberals rightly
contend - has led to overstaffing, low morale, and
widespread inefficiency It has also led to wide-
spread corruption.
Venezuela, again, provides some illustrations. The
National Institution of Sanitation (INOS) is respon-
sible, among other things, for the public supply of
water. In 1989 and 1990 INOS officials deposited
two and a half billion bolivares with eight private
sector banks despite the fact that this practise had
been forbidden by the Central Bank. According to
the Auditor General's report of 1990 these deposits
earned interest rates at 30 percentage points below
the prevailing market rate. In return the banks paid
an under the counter commission of 5 per cent.
The point is that this particular scam by INOS had
been denounced in Congress as early as 1985 but
investigations by the Superintendancy of Banks had
produced no results.
Of even greater public concern has been the way in
which partidocracia has contaminated the judicial
system. A particularly notorious Venezuelan exam-
ple of the failure of the courts to take appropriate
action arose out of the Recadi scandal. In 1989 the
TSS (Public Property Protection Court) issued arrest
warrants against 10 high officials of the Lusinchi
government on the grounds that they had issued
sus 8 billion over and above the amount autho-
rized in the foreign exchange budget. All but two
of them, having been tipped off, fled the country,
including the Ministers of Finance, Development,
Planning, Agriculture and a President of the Central
Bank. Less than three months later the Supreme
Court revoked the warrants, declared that it was not
a penal matter, and ordered all investigations to
cease. Those concerned were able to return to
Venezuela. Capriles and Diaz are in no doubt as to
why the Supreme Court came to this decision:
As everyone knows, the judges of the Supreme
Court and the Supreme Judicial Council are
appointed by the top leaders (of ihe main two
parties). Even if they are not paid up members
of the party they are allied to them and their
leaders. They don't need to receive direct
instructions ... The survival of the system would
not allow such high officials whatever their
party, to be condemned.
(Capriles 1992: 660-1)
It might be argued that Venezuela is an atypical
case. Certainly, no other country enjoys the petro-
leum rent around whose distribution Venezuelan
politics revolve, but this has to be set against the
68
fact that Venezuela is widely regarded as one of the
most democratic countries of the region. Either
there is something very badly wrong with
Venezuelan democracy or the supposed tension
between democratic values and corrupt behaviour
may not be as clear as has been suggested. The
question then is, to what extent do party systems in
the rest of Latin America resemble Venezuela?
First, very few enjoy the institutionalized competi-
tion and alternation of parties in office which is
characteristic of Venezuela. In general, the pattern
is one of loose coalitions on the Brazilian model or
hegemonic movements of the sort found in Mexico
or Argentina. If political competition is an impor-
tant element in controlling corruption then the
overall position does not seem particularly propi-
tious. Moreover, even where two party politics is
well-established, as in Colombia and uruguay, its
competitiveness is much diminished by informal
pacts.
Second, the rest of the continent resembles
Venezuela in so far as party politics is largely non-
ideological. The struggle is for the fruits of office
rather than one of ideas. Ideological parties do exist
but none have very much electoral weight. This is
not to suggest that ideologically informed parties
are necessarily more honest than non-ideological
ones (though the parties of the left in Latin America
probably have been more honest), but rather that
political parties are not even effective vehicles for
aggregating notional policy choices. In short, vot-
ers can have little or no idea of what they are
voting for.
Third, the clientelistic, authoritarian, and personal-
istic characteristics of Venezuelan parties are widely
replicated. Though some of the newer parties such
as Brazil's Workers Party or even Venezuela's Radical
Cause do appear to be reasonably plural in their
internal workings, the general pattern is one of
leadership - often highly personalistic - dominance
over the rank and file.
Fourth, the electoral systems of Latin America are
not conducive to party accountability Multi-mem-
ber constituencies, high voter - representative
ratios, quotas, and closed party lists greatly reduce
the contact between the electorate and its represen-
tatives. Instead, parties are prone to capture by
special interests and to pacted rather than genuinely
competitive politics.
Finally, there is the issue of public opinion. The
reform view argues that the average voter is
offended by corruption and would like to see it
reduced. Opinion poll data in country after coun-
try endorses this view but distaste for corruption is
quite compatible with acceptance of it and even
involvement in it. Whilst corruption might tem-
porarily arouse public anger it is nowhere near as
important an issue with the electorate as jobs,
wages and services.
3 Conclusion: Prospects for
Reform and Latin American
Democracy
The reform agenda is by now well known: public
service training; improved public sector wages and
pensions and greater wage differentiation; minister-
ial watchdog units; codes of ethics; enhanced disci-
plinary measures; integrated task forces; rewards
for whistle-blowing; ombudsmen; and more simpli-
fied administration. However, if the success of
efforts to date are any guide, such measures, whilst
perhaps desirable in themselves, are difficult to
sustain in the longer term. Not only do they take
decades to come to fruition but they require a
degree of political will which has so far not been
forthcoming.
The alternative liberal agenda is yet more radical.
This would include not only the above but also root
and branch public sector reform, a drastic overhaul
of the judiciary, parliamentary reform, decentraliza-
tion, and the creation of a genuinely competitive
private sector to replace corrupt public sector
monopolies. The scale of such a project far eclipses
the more modest reform agenda.
The problem with any reform is the cui bono one.
The general public might benefit but the political
and administrative classes who would have to initi-
ate and sustain the reform process would not. Why
then should they bother? For them the more
immediate response of denunciation in order to
ride the temporary storm would seem to be more
Some would add welfare outcomes, but this is a
contingent rather than a necessary criterion and is not
discussed here. However, I have previousâly argued that
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sensible and also appears to have been what has
actually been happening. Mexico and Colombia
aside, the issue of corruption is certainly less salient
than it was four or five years ago.
The only real chance for significant change in cor-
rupt behaviour by elites will arise - if it arises at all
- from fear of retribution by the people. For this to
happen the political systems of Latin America
would have to become a lot more responsive than
they currently are. That is, today's formal democ-
racy would have to become substantive.
Democracy can be defined in terms of contestation
and rights.6 On the first, Latin America has made
some progress insofar as elections are more fre-
quent, more honest, and more respected than they
were. There is also greater freedom of expression,
at least in urban areas. However, effective partic-
ipation involves more than casting a vote. In the
ongoing sense of participation Latin America has a
very divergent tradition. At the producer level
(employers associations, the military, the church) it
has a powerful, corporatist tradition but at the con-
sumer or civil level a very weak one. Grass roots
organizations focused around ethnic, community,
and environmental issues have emerged in recent
years but they too are prone to capture and are in
any case still very weak. In short, in Latin America
even more than in the well-established democracies
the structure of everyday participation is biased
towards the privileged and powerful.
Thus, even if one accepts the most minimally liberal
approach to defining democracy (accountability via
elections), then the Latin American picture is a
mixed one. Costa Rica and Uruguay (and possible
Venezuela, Argentina and Chile) might muster two
cheers. Mexico, Central America and Paraguay
would be hard pressed to muster one. Brazil, Peru,
Ecuador and Bolivia would fall somewhere in the
middle. Genuine contestation in the sense of free-
dom from constraints and more or less extensive
participation is at best embryonic ici Latin America.
If a less modest definition of democracy is taken then
the picture becomes even more problematic. Such
a definition is implicit within liberallinstitutionalist
elite corruption is ultimately paid for by the poor. See
Little 1992.
approaches and has to do with the idea of substan-
tive justice. Thus when minimalists speak of free-
dom and participation they are referring to the idea
that, whatever might be the distribution of social
and economic power in society, the basic civil lib-
erties of citizens must be respected by the state and
those who control it. Civic equity or fairness
translates into the idea that citizens should be
treated even-handedly by those in authority and
in accordance with civilized legal standards.
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